Abstract-Differentiated service (DiffServ) is a mechanism to provide the quality-of-service (QoS) with a certain performance guarantee. In this paper, we study how to design DiffServ multicast when every relay link is an independent selfish agent. We assume that each link is associated with a (privately known) cost coefficient such that the cost of to provide a transmission service with bandwidth demand is . Further, we assume that there is a fixed source node and a set of receivers, each of which requires from data with a minimum bandwidth demand. The DiffServ multicast problem is to compute a link-weighted tree rooted at and spanning such that the receivers' demands are met. This generalizes the traditional link-weighted Steiner tree problem. We first show that a previous approximation algorithm does not directly induce a strategyproof mechanism. We then give a new polynomial time algorithm to construct a DiffServ multicast tree whose total cost is no more than eight times the optimal total cost when the cost coefficient of each link is known. Based on this tree, we design a truthful mechanism for DiffServ multicast, i.e., we give a polynomial-time computable payment scheme to compensate all chosen relay links such that each link maximizes its profit when it declares its cost coefficient truthfully.
distribution. Although multicast and DiffServ are complementary technologies, there are still some architectural conflicts between them. The first notable conflict is that multicast often requires the maintenance of per-group state information at all routers, while DiffServ usually relies on the statelessness of the core. The second notable conflict is that multicast is often based on receiver-driven QoS, while DiffServ is usually based on sender-driven QoS. Edge-based multicast (EBM) approach was proposed recently to address these possible conflicts. In this paper, we characterize the different QoS of the links by the amount of bandwidth they dedicate to the multicast transmission.
In a multicast, different receivers of a multicast group could request different bandwidth demands, which often reflect different qualities of services the receivers will get. Each link of the network may have a different cost of providing multicast with different bandwidth dedication [4] . Due to the heterogeneity in receivers' bandwidth demands, different links in a multicast tree will carry different amount of traffic such that the demand requirements of downstream receivers are satisfied. The cost of a link in a multicast tree is then the cost needed to dedicate a certain bandwidth for downstream receivers; it is typically determined by the maximum bandwidth required by downstream receivers, as well as the cost coefficient of the link (which we will define later). The DiffServ multicast problem is to compute a tree and the bandwidth at each link of the tree such that the receivers' bandwidth QoS demands are met. Note that the traditional Steiner tree problem for link-weighted graph [5] , [6] , an NP-hard problem, is a special case of the problem of computing a DiffServ multicast tree with the minimum cost.
What introduces an additional degree of complexity to DiffServ multicast is that the relay links may be noncooperative, 1 instead of cooperative as assumed by previous protocols. This means that the relay links will aim to maximize their own benefits instead of the whole network's performance. We assume that a link will provide the service to receivers only if it receives a payment large enough to compensate its relay cost. To do so, each link is first asked to report its relay cost, and then a payment to this link is calculated based on a certain payment scheme. It is often not in the best interests of these relay links to report their costs truthfully when they are paid whatever they ask for. Thus, instead of paying the links their declared costs, we should design a payment scheme that can ensure that all links reveal their true costs for their own interests, a property known as strategyproofness. The strategyproof mechanism for traditional multicast has been previously addressed in [7] and [8] . However, unlike the traditional multicast in which every 1 It could happen when they are individually owned.
link has a fixed cost in the multicast transmission, each link may incur different costs for different bandwidth demands in DiffServ multicast.
In summary, in this paper, we study two different aspects of the DiffServ multicast: the construction of the multicast tree that has low cost, and a strategyproof payment scheme. The main contributions of this paper are as follows. First of all, we show that a previous approximation algorithm does not directly induce a strategyproof mechanism. We give an alternative polynomial time algorithm to construct a DiffServ multicast tree whose total cost is no more than eight times the optimal total cost when the cost coefficient of each link is known. We then characterize the necessary and sufficient conditions for the multicast tree construction algorithms based on which we can design a strategyproof payment scheme. Finally, we design a truthful algorithmic mechanism for DiffServ multicast, i.e., we give a polynomial-time computable payment scheme to compensate all chosen relay links (by our multicast tree construction method) such that each link maximizes its profit when it declares its cost coefficient truthfully.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we specify the network model, define the problem, and review the necessary technical preliminaries. We also briefly review some approximation algorithms to construct multicast trees. We study how to pay the links in Section IV after presenting our approximation algorithm for constructing the multicast tree in Section III. We conclude our paper by pointing out some possible future work in Section V.
II. PRELIMINARIES AND PREVIOUS WORKS

A. Algorithmic Mechanism Design
In a standard model of algorithmic mechanism design, there are agents . Each agent has some private information , called its type, (e.g., the cost to forward a packet for a node/link in a network environment). The types of all agents define a profile . Each agent declares a valid type , which may be different from its actual type , and the strategies of all agents define a declared type vector . A mechanism is composed of two parts: an output function that maps a declared type vector to an output and a payment function that decides the monetary payment for every agent . Each agent has a valuation function that expressed its preference over different outcomes. Agent 's utility (also called profit) is , given the declared vector type . An agent is said to be rational if it always chooses its strategy that maximizes its utility . Let , i.e., the strategies of all other agents except , and let . A mechanism is strategyproof if for every agent , revealing its true type will maximize its utility regardless of what other agents do. In this paper, we are only interested in mechanisms that satisfy the following three conditions. 1) Incentive compatibility (IC): agent , , .
2) Individual rationality (IR) (a.k.a., voluntary participation): Each agent must have a nonnegative utility, i.e., . 3) Polynomial time computability (PC): and are computed in polynomial time.
Notice that in a strategyproof mechanism, there is no budgetbalance: the total payment to all selfish agents could be arbitrarily larger than the total declared truthful cost of all agents [9] , [10] . Recently, there have been some studies to quantify the worst performances of a strategyproof mechanism [9] - [12] , or to design strategyproof mechanisms with better performances [11] , [13] . In addition to strategyproof algorithm mechanisms, other approaches to deal with the selfishness of agents include auctions [14] and reputation-inference [15] . The advantage of having a strategyproof mechanism is its simplicity: it is simple to implement and it relieves all agent from guessing other's actions and possibly declaring a much higher cost. Another advantage of using a strategyproof mechanism is that, given an algorithm constructing the multicast tree with approximation ratio , the multicast tree used will have a real cost no more than a certain factor times of the minimum real cost. This is often called bounded social efficiency. If the optimal tree construction method is used, then the tree is the actual optimal tree. However, when agents declare their costs untruthfully, it will be difficult, if not impossible, to bound the total real cost of the output compared with the real optimal solution.
B. Problem Statement
DiffServ multicast tree construction: We assume that there is a connected network with vertex set , edge set , where and . Every edge has a cost function if is the bandwidth dedicates to a multicast transmission. Hereafter, is called the cost coefficient of the link . All links' coefficients define a vector . There is a source node and a set of receivers that request to receive the multicast service. Every receiver has a bandwidth demand that specifies the minimum bandwidth it needs. The DiffServ multicast is also called quality-of-service Steiner tree (QoSST) problem in [16] .
A bandwidth demand is homogeneous if all receivers require the same bandwidth. This is the standard Steiner tree problem, for which several constant approximation algorithms [5] , [6] have been proposed. For DiffServ multicast, different receivers may require different bandwidths. The DiffServ multicast problem consists of two parts: 1) a network topology rooted at the sender that spans all receivers in the receiver set; 2) a bandwidth for each link for this multicast. The tree topology and bandwidth assignments should satisfy that for any receiver , each link on the path between and in the tree has a bandwidth not smaller than . Thus, for a link , the bandwidth should not be smaller than the maximum bandwidth demand of its downstream receivers. The cost of a multicast topology with link bandwidth vector is . Given the cost coefficients vector and the bandwidth demand of all receivers, the DiffServ multicast problem is to construct a tree and a bandwidth such that is minimized.
The DiffServ multicast problem was studied before in several contexts. Maxemchuk [4] proposed a heuristic algorithm for its solution. Some results for the case of few rates were obtained in [17] and [18] . For example, for the case of two nonzero rates, a -approximation algorithm was proposed [18] , where is the currently best approximation ratio [6] for the Steiner tree problem. Recently, Charikar et al. [19] gave the first constant-factor approximation algorithm for an unbounded number of rates. They achieved an approximation ratio of using rounding and using randomized rounding. Recently, Karpinski et al. [16] gave algorithms with improved approximation factors. They achieved an approximation ratio of 1.960 when there are two nonzero rates and an approximation ratio of 3.802 when there are an unbounded number of rates. Calinescu et al. [20] gave a Primal-Dual algorithm with approximation ratio 4.311. Xue et al. [21] and Kim et al. [22] studied the grade-of-service Steiner tree problem (GOSST) in Euclidean planes.
Output and payment computation: Throughout this paper, we assume all the links are selfish and rational. Recall that a mechanism consists of two parts: an output method and a payment scheme . Each edge is required to reveal its cost coefficient and it could declare a value that is different from . Thus, we use to denote the declared cost coefficient vector. Given receiver set and declared cost coefficient vector , the output method computes a multicast tree and a valid bandwidth vector . Here, is the bandwidth on link . After designing the output method , we need to design a payment scheme for the links such that the mechanism is truthful. Given the receiver set and declared cost coefficient vector , we use to denote the total payment to the links, i.e., . Here, denotes the payment to a link given the cost coefficient vector and the receiver set . Notice that the widely used Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism [23] - [25] can be used to design a strategyproof mechanism for the traditional multicast problem (when all receivers have the same demand) with the objective to minimize the total cost of the multicast tree when we can find the minimum-cost multicast tree. However, the optimum solution is often difficult to obtain: it is well-known that finding minimum-cost multicast tree is an NP-complete problem. Therefore, VCG mechanism for traditional multicast cannot be implemented in polynomial time unless
. We thus see the tradeoff of efficiency for complexity. Actually, we will show that VCG mechanism does not work for general DiffServ multicast problem.
C. Literature Review of Steiner Tree Construction
If all receivers have the same bandwidth QoS demand, the DiffServ problem becomes the standard link-weighted Steiner tree problem. In link-weighted Steiner tree, each link has a fixed cost for a unit bandwidth and all bandwidth in the tree can be normalized to unit. Notice that equals the cost coefficient in the DiffServ multicast problem, thus for notational consistency, we use to denote the input for the link-weighted Steiner tree problem. The link-weighted Steiner tree problem enjoys several constant approximation algorithms [5] , [6] . In Algorithm 1, we review a 2-approximation algorithm given in [5] . We call the tree constructed by Algorithm 1 a Link Weighted Steiner Tree (LST), denoted as where is declared cost coefficient vector.
Algorithm 1 Construct homogeneous multicast tree [H. Takahashi and A. Matsuyama [5]]
Input: A network G = (V; E), the cost coefficient vector c, a source node s and a set of receivers R. Output: A tree LS T (R; c) rooted at s that spans the receiver set R.
1:
Initialize LST (R; c) = ;.
2:
for each receive r i in R do 4:
Find the shortest path between s and r i under link cost coefficient vector c, denoted by (s; ri ; c).
5:
end for 6:
Find the receiver r j that is closest to the source.
7:
Remove rj from R and add the path (s; rj ; c) to LST (R; c).
Set all links' cost on the path (s; r j ; c) as 0, i.e., set c i = 0 if and only if ei 2 (s; rj ; c).
until R is empty. 10: Output LST (R; c).
For DiffServ multicast, the algorithm by Charikar et al. [19] works as follows. Given an instance of the DiffServ multicast, they first construct the rounded-up instance by rounding up all demands of receivers to the nearest power of 2. Then, they solve the standard Steiner tree problem for the receivers of each different demand separately by applying any of the well-known heuristics such as Algorithm 1. Finally, they do a "cleanup" process that transforms the graph given by the union of these Steiner trees into a tree and chooses the bandwidth of each link to be the maximum bandwidth demand of its downstream receivers. They proved that this simple approach yields a approximation of the optimal cost, where is the approximation factor of the Steiner tree heuristic used. When Algorithm 1 is used as the Steiner tree heuristic, and the overall approximation ratio is 8. For notational simplicity, we denote the algorithm as Charikar-Takahashi algorithm. Our algorithm is similar to Charikar-Takahashi algorithm at the first glance, but it has some key differences that will be described later.
III. A NEW APPROXIMATION ALGORITHM
In this section, we present an alternative DiffServ multicast tree construction algorithm to the algorithm in [19] . Before we present our algorithm, we define some notations that will be used later. For a set of receivers with bandwidth demand vector , we denote the multicast tree with the minimal weight that spans as and the corresponding bandwidth allocation vector as , where is the cost coefficient vector. If the receivers have homogenous bandwidth demand, then the minimum link-weighted Steiner tree, which is denoted as , does not depend on . Given a subset and a tree that spans , we use to denote the subtree in induced by if no confusion is caused.
Given a receiver set , a cost coefficient vector and a bandwidth demand vector , following algorithm shows how to find a DiffServ multicast tree and its corresponding bandwidth allocation with low weight. We also call this algorithm if no confusion is caused. Basically, Algorithm 1 constructs a DiffServ multicast tree as follows. It first sorts the demands of all receivers in a descending order and groups them into several groups such that the largest demand in each group is at most 2 times the smallest demand in that group. Starting from the group containing the largest demand, it constructs a multicast tree to span the receivers in this group using Algorithm 1. It then marks the cost of links chosen as 0 since we will use them anyway to span these receivers and their bandwidths are enough to support any future receivers if they are also chosen later. We then process all groups in the descending order of their demands. Remember that when process the th group, the links chosen to span any group with will have cost marked as 0. 
2:
Initialize the tree T to empty and index t = 1.
3:
For each link e i , label it as WHITE and set B i = 0. 4:
Let r j be the first receiver in the receiver set R and find the maximum index k such that
6:
Set the cost coefficient of each BLACK link as 0, i.e., c i = 0 if e i is BLACK. 7:
Let R t = fr j ; 1 1 1 ; r k g and find the spanning tree T t = LST (R t ; c) using Algorithm 1. 8:
Remove R t from R and mark all links in tree LST (Rt; c) as BLACK. 9:
Set T = T T t . 10:
for each link e i 2 T t do 11:
Set Bi = dj . 12: end for 13:
Set t = t + 1. 14: until the receiver set R is empty. 15: Output DM T (R; c) = T and bandwidth vector B .
The major difference of this algorithm compared with the Charikar algorithm is that, instead of computing several trees independently, and then combining them to make the final DiffServ multicast tree, we construct a single tree directly. The receiver set is divided into subsets, each containing receivers with demands in a particular range. These subsets are handled in multiple rounds, in a descending order according to their bandwidth demand ranges. In each round, all receivers in a subset are connected to the DiffServ multicast tree being built. The links picked in earlier rounds will be used in later rounds, without additional costs involved, to connect receivers with lower demands.
Notice that, as indicated by Line 11 of Algorithm 2, for each link added into in round the bandwidth allocation of is set to be the maximum bandwidth demand among all receivers in . This may be more than necessary; after all, will not be relaying packets for all of them. Indeed, one can design the following Algorithm 3, which constructs the same tree as Algorithm 2 does, and yet allocates less bandwidth on each link by setting the bandwidth allocation to be maximum bandwidth demand of 's downstream receivers. In order to distinguish these two algorithms, we use to denote the tree constructed by Algorithm 3. As minor (and harmless) as this modification seems to be, Algorithm 3 does not induce a truthful payment scheme. In the next section, we will use this algorithm as an example to show how to use a general criterion to determine the truthfulness of a payment scheme induced by a given algorithm. We have the following theorem for the approximation bound of Algorithm 2 and Algorithm 3. Although there are only subtle differences between these two algorithms presented here and the one in [19] , the proof is not as obvious as that one.
Theorem 1: Both Algorithm 2 and 3 construct a tree whose cost is at most eight times the cost of the minimal cost DiffServ multicast tree.
Proof: The proofs for both algorithms are similar. Since the cost of the tree constructed by Algorithm 2 is not smaller than the cost of the tree constructed by Algorithm 3, in the following we only prove the case for Algorithm 2. For notational convenience, we use and to denote the tree and bandwidth allocation vector computed by Algorithm 2. Remember that is the tree found in the th iteration by applying Algorithm 1. Without loss of generality, we assume that there are iterations in Algorithm 3. Let be a partition of receiver set , and let (respectively, ) be the maximum (respectively, minimal) bandwidth demand in the receiver set . For notational simplicity, we use and to denote and , respectively.
Recall that each link in tree should be able to supply a bandwidth larger than . Thus
For set , we have
Similarly, for any set , we have
Summing the inequalities for from 1 to , we obtain This finishes our proof.
IV. PAYMENT FOR SELFISH LINKS
In this section, we first show that VCG mechanism does not work for any algorithms that we proposed before. In light of the failure of the VCG mechanism, some truthful mechanisms that are not based on VCG are needed. Instead of simply presenting a truthful payment scheme for a specific DiffServ multicast tree construction algorithm, such as Algorithm 2, we study a general framework to design a truthful payment scheme for any given tree construction algorithm. In Section IV-B, we fist give a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a truthful payment scheme for a given tree construction algorithm. In the meanwhile, we also present a truthful payment scheme if it exists. We then apply this general framework to the DiffServ multicast tree constructed by Algorithm 2 and design a truthful payment scheme. In this section, we need to distinguish between the declared cost coefficient vector and actual cost coefficient vector .
A. Failure of VCG Mechanism
Arguably the most positive result in mechanism design is what is usually called the generalized VCG mechanism by Vickrey [23] , Clarke [24] , and Groves [25] . Although the family of VCG mechanisms is powerful, but it has its limitations. To use VCG mechanism, we have to compute the exact output that maximizes the total valuation of all agents. In our case, we need to find the tree with the minimum cost that is computationally intractable. Most often, replacing the optimal algorithm with nonoptimal approximation usually leads to untruthful mechanisms if VCG mechanism is used [26] .
Unfortunately, if we insist on using VCG mechanism for those algorithms we proposed above, none of the resulting mechanisms is truthful. Moreover, even for the special case when bandwidth on each link and for each receiver are homogeneous, VCG mechanism still fails. Recall that when bandwidths are homogenous, Algorithm 3, 2, and the Charikar-Takahashi Algorithm are exactly Algorithm 1. Thus, in the following, we focus on Algorithm 1. Given a receiver set and declared vector , if we apply VCG mechanism to Algorithm 1, the payment to an edge is Next, we show that this mechanism does not satisfy IR property, i.e., it is possible that some edges have negative utility if each link reveals its actual cost coefficient. Fig. 1 illustrates the example with terminal being the source terminal. In this example, each link reveals its actual cost coefficient, i.e., . It is not difficult to show that, in the first round, link is selected to connect terminals and with cost 2; in round , we will select link to connect to with cost 2. Thus, the tree is path , whose cost is . When link is not used, it is easy to see that the tree only uses terminal to connect all receivers with total cost . Thus, the utility of link is , which is negative when . Thus, the VCG-based mechanism is not truthful.
B. General Framework
From the definition of the truthfulness, we can fix the graph , the receiver set , and bandwidth demand . Thus, for our notational convenience, we use to denote the bandwidth vector computed by an algorithm for links, where is the bandwidth on link . Here, we assume that is piecewise continuous with respect to any variable , i.e., a finite number of piecewise linear functions. The only possible types of discontinuities for a piecewise continuous function are removable and step discontinuities. In the following, we give a definition that is critical to the presentation of our general framework.
Definition 1 [Monotone Nonincreasing Property (MNP)]:
An algorithm is said to satisfy the monotone nonincreasing property if for every link and any two of its possible coefficients , . Now, we are ready to present the necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of truthful mechanism given an algorithm that computes the bandwidth. This theorem is similar to the forklore for the binary demand games.
Theorem 2: For a given algorithm , there exists a payment scheme such that the mechanism is truthful if and only if satisfies MNP. . We define a function such that, for
In Fig. 2 , corresponds to the area of the shaded region. Given an algorithm and a coefficient vector , Algorithm 4 defines the payment based on algorithm . Fix a 0i . The payment to i is P i (A; a) = i (a i ).
3: end for
Thus, we only need to prove the payment scheme computed by Algorithm 4 is truthful. See Lemma 7 in the appendix for the proof of this statement. This finishes the proof of the theorem.
We note that the above theorem applies to any problem (e.g., job scheduling) when the cost of an agent is of format , where is a privately known cost-coefficient and is its load computed by output method. Actually, Archer and Tardos [27] proved a similar result for job scheduling. If we require that a link that has 0 bandwidth should receive 0 payment (which is called normalized payment scheme), then we have the following theorem.
Theorem 3: Given an algorithm satisfying MNP, the payment scheme defined by Algorithm 4 is the only normalized truthful payment scheme.
Proof We then summarize the general framework to design a truthful payment scheme , such that is truthful, for a given output algorithm that constructs a DiffServ multicast tree and outputs the bandwidth allocation for DiffServ multicast. 
C. Design Truthful Mechanism
We first show that, there is no truthful payment scheme based on Algorithm 3 and Algorithm by Charikar et al. [19] .
Theorem 4: There is no truthful mechanism that uses either Algorithm 3 or Charikar-Takahashi algorithm as its output method.
According to Theorem 2, it suffices to prove the following Lemma. Proof: We prove it by presenting a counter example illustrated by Fig. 3 . A network has three receivers , , with bandwidth demand and . Under this bandwidth demand vector, all receivers' demand will be rounded to the same value and only one iteration of Algorithm 1 is needed. Thus, both Algorithm 3 and Charikar-Takahashi algorithm output the same tree and bandwidth vector. The coefficient of the link is described in Fig. 3(a) . Now, we apply Algorithm 3 to network . In the first iteration, path is chosen (with cost 9); in the second iteration, path is chosen (with cost 8); and in the last iteration, path is chosen (with cost 12.1). The final tree shown in Fig. 3(b) . The bandwidth allocation of link is 1.5. Consider the scenario when the coefficient of link changes from 1.1 to 0.9, while other coefficients remain the same. When apply Algorithm 3 to network , in the first iteration, path is chosen (with cost 8.9); in the second iteration, path is chosen (with cost 9.9); and in the last iteration, path is chosen (with cost 9). The new spanning tree topology is shown in Fig. 3(c) . The bandwidth on becomes 1, which is decreased compared with the former case when the coefficient is 1.1. This contradicts the MNP property and finishes our proof.
The above example also shows that there is no strategyproof mechanism for the DiffServ multicast tree construction method presented in [19] when the bandwidth on any link is taken as the maximum bandwidth demand of its downstream receivers. Meanwhile, we can show that there exists a truthful payment scheme for Algorithm 2 with the following theorem.
Theorem 6: Algorithm 2 satisfies MNP. Proof: Given a link , if it does not appear in the tree , then . Otherwise, if , i.e., in iteration , the link is added to the spanning tree for the first time, then . When declares a smaller coefficient , we show by cases that its bandwidth does not become smaller.
Case 1) is added to the spanning tree before the th iteration of REPEAT loop in iteration . Without loss of generality, we assume that is added to in iteration . Remember that the partition of does not depend on coefficient vector , thus .
Case 2) is not added to the spanning tree before the th iteration of REPEAT loop in Algorithm 2. In this case, each link's label does not change in the beginning of iteration . Following we show that the link must in the tree . From our assumption, is in the tree and without loss of generality, we assume that is in path that is selected in the th iteration of Algorithm 1. If is selected before th iteration of Algorithm 1 when we constructing tree , then the argument is proven. Otherwise, we can assume that is not selected before iteration . Notice that if is not selected before th iteration, each path selected before th iteration should be the same. In other words, in the beginning of iteration of Algorithm 1, (1) the receiver set is the same; (2) the cost of each link except is the same. Thus, if is the cost vector in the beginning of iteration when input is , then is the cost vector in the beginning of iteration when input is
. It is not difficult to observe that the path is decreases by if is the cost vector. On the other hand, the cost of any path is decreased at most if is the cost vector instead of . Thus, path is also selected under cost vector . Thus, is selected by Algorithm 2 before iteration , which means that .
This proves that does not decrease when decreases. Thus, Algorithm 2 satisfies MNP.
In order to find the truthful payment for Algorithm 2, we should find the bandwidth output function for every link first. Recall that for every link , the bandwidth could only be a real value that is equal to for some index . Let be the points at which is not continuous, then the bandwidth allocation function should be a constant, say in , as shown in Fig. 2 . In order to find the values of these discontinuous points, we first need to compute the truthful payment for standard Steiner tree problem. Following we brief review the algorithm to compute the payment for Algorithm 1. Please refer for [8] for more details.
Algorithm 5 Payment based on Algorithm 1
Input: A network G with link cost coefficient vector a, a source node s and a receiver set R.
Output: A truthful payment based on Algorithm 1.
Compute LST (R; a) using Algorithm 1.
2:
for each link e i 2 (R; a) do
3:
Set temp i = ai for each link ei.
4:
Set ai = 1, and pi = 0.
5:
Find the shortest path (s; r i ; a) between s and r i for each receive ri in R.
7:
Find the receiver rj that is closest to the source. 8:
Set a i = 0 and find the shortest path (s; r i ; a) between s and r i for each receive ri in R.
9:
Find the receiver r 0 j that is closest to the source and let j 0 j j be the cost of the shortest path between s and rj'.
10:
Set a i = 1.
11:
Remove r j from R and add the path (s; r i ; a) to LST (R; a).
12:
Set all links' cost on the path 
13:
Set pi = maxfpi; j (s; rj; c)k 0 j 0 j jg.
14:
until R is empty.
15:
Set a i = temp i for each link e i .
16: end for
17: Set P i (R; a) = p i and output P.
For clarity of the notation, we use to denote the payment computed for a link by Algorithm 5 and study how to find the bandwidth allocation function for Algorithm 2. Algorithm 6 shows how we can find the bandwidth-allocation function.
Algorithm 6 Bandwidth Output Function for Algorithm 2
Input: A network G with declared link cost vector a, a source node s and a receiver set R with demand vector d.
Output:
The bandwidth output function for Algorithm 2.
Compute DMT (R; a) and bandwidth vector B.
2:
for each link e i in DMT (R; a) do
3:
Label each link it as WHITE. 4:
5:
Set ai = 1 and index t = 1.
6:
Initialize the list X i = ;, Y i = ;, up = 0, and q = 0.
7:
repeat 8:
Let rj be the first receiver in the receiver set R and find the maximum index k such that d k (dj =2).
9:
Set the cost coefficient of each BLACK link as 0, i.e., ai = 0 if ei is BLACK.
10:
Let Rt = frj; 1 11;r k g and find the spanning tree LST (R t ; c) using Set q = q + 1 and up = i (R t ; a).
15:
Set x i q = i(Rt; a) and y i q = R max t .
16:
Add x i q to set X i and y i q to Y i .
17: end if 18:
Set t = t + 1.
19:
until R is empty 20:
Set x i 0 = 0 and x q+1 = 1.
21:
for i = 1 to q + 1 do
22:
Set O DMT i (R; aj i x) = y i j for x i j01 x < x i j .
23: end for 24:
Set ai = temp i for each link ei.
25: end for
With the bandwidth allocation function , we give our truthful payment scheme, as illustrated by Algorithm 7, by using the general framework. The proof of the correctness of these algorithms are either straightforward or omitted here due to space limit. Notice that since Algorithm 3 often constructs a multicast tree with less cost than the multicast tree constructed by Algorithm 2, the multicast "principal" may jump to Algorithm 3 after all links declared their cost coefficients. This will be prevented from the untruthfulness of Algorithm 3 when links knew that the "principal" will jump to Algorithm 3, i.e., links could lie to gain more benefits. When links are unaware of this jump, we need a trusted third-party to prevent the principal from changing the multicast-tree construction algorithm.
Algorithm 7 Payment Scheme for Algorithm 2
Input: A network G with cost coefficient vector a, a source node s and a receiver set R with demand vector d.
Output: A truthful payment P DMT for Algorithm 2. if e i is in tree DM T (R; a) then
5:
Find an index j such that 
D. Performance Improvement and Special Case
In essence, Algorithm 2 converts the original instance of the DiffServ multicast problem to a "rounded-up" one, with bandwidth demand vector forming a geometric sequence of ratio 2. According to the result of Charikar et al. [19] , the approximation ratio of 8 of Algorithm 2 can be improved (while still using Algorithm 1 for computing approximately optimal Steiner trees) if the "randomized bucketing" technique is used. Specifically, a number is picked randomly with a uniform distribution in the range [0,1], and the (nonzero) bandwidth demands of all receivers are rounded up to the nearest . (Note that the ratio of the geometric sequence is instead of 2.) The expected approximation ratio is . Here, we argue that we can also convert the mechanism described above for DiffServ multicast to a randomized one with an expected approximation ratio of 5.437, while maintaining strategyproofness. First of all, in Algorithm 2, we group the receivers according to their bandwidths: a receiver with minimum bandwidth (the minimum bandwidth is called "start point" in literatures) that is not grouped yet is chosen and each receiver whose bandwidth is at most two times the minimum bandwidth is fallen into the same group. On the other hand, if we use as the start point for some fixed and replacing the ratio of 2 by for the geometric sequence (of rounded up bandwidth demands) should not affect strategyproofness. Furthermore, the randomized process also does not encourage untruthfulness of the links: if for any fixed start point , the links find no incentive to lie, nor will they find incentives to lie when such start point is randomly selected.
Charikar et al. [19] also proposed a derandomized process to replace the above random selection of start point , with the cost of an increased time complexity. For each distinct bandwidth demand , the same algorithm is invoked with . It is claimed that there is at least one such that the solution for has a cost no more than the expected cost of the solution for a randomly picked . Therefore, we can simply pick the best solution (with the minimum cost) among all solutions computed using different . A similar technique is used for the case with only two nonzero rates for bandwidth demands [18] , improving the approximation bound to . The common characteristic of the two algorithms is to compute multiple DiffServ multicast trees using different methods (or same method but with different parameters), and pick the one with the smallest cost. Although this approach (i.e., taking the best output of several outcomes and using a certain combination of the payments for these separated games as its final payment) works for binary selection problems under certain conditions [28] , [29] , a problem arises when it comes to determining the payments to the links for DiffServ multicast.
In the network shown in Fig. 4(a) , receiver has bandwidth demand unit and each of receivers , , has bandwidth demand . Let and , and let be the cost vector shown in Fig. 4(a) . Let be the cost vector we get by changing the cost of edge from to , while keeping all other links' costs unchanged. Fig. 4 shows that the tree and tree are the same. We have . Fig. 4(c) shows the tree and its weight is for small . Thus, when has cost , it has bandwidth . Now, consider the cost vector . Fig. 4(c) shows the tree and its weight is for small . Thus, when has cost , its bandwidth is 0. This shows that the tree output by the algorithm in [18] violates the monotone nonincreasing property (MNP), which implies that there is no truthful payment.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we studied the DiffServ multicast problem in a game theoretic context, where network links are selfish agents who would demand payments to at least cover their costs when relaying data packets, and may lie about their actual costs in order to maximize their gains. We show that a naive conversion of the previously known 8-approximation algorithm does not work. We then propose an alternative approximation algorithm for DiffServ multicast with the same approximation bound. We also introduced a general method to convert any DiffServ multicast algorithm satisfying the MNP to a strategyproof mechanism, and applied it to the algorithm we proposed.
The strategyproof payment scheme is not the end story for designing protocols for DiffServ multicast. The very natural question to ask is how these payments can be split among the receivers, which is known as the multicast payment sharing problem [7] . Several criteria [7] , [30] for the fairness of sharing have been proposed in previous work, and we would like to design payment sharing schemes that are considered to be fair according to these criteria. Another important work is to design distributed implementations of our proposed strategyproof mechanism, which could be based on some results in [31] , [32] . Last, but not the least, since strategyproof mechanisms will often pay more than what the agents declared, it is an interesting future work to design scheme that could result in a less total payment by the multicast principal at some certain equilibrium of the agents' declaration. Some initial work has been done in this direction for unicast [14] , [33] , [34] .
APPENDIX
Lemma 7: Algorithm 4 defines a truthful payment scheme.
Proof: Hereafter, we always fix , i.e., we are interested only in . Notice that when reveals its true coefficient , its utility is . Remember that is nonnegative. Thus, , which implies that payment scheme 4 satisfies IR. To prove that payment scheme 4 satisfies IC, we prove it by cases. This proves that node does not have incentive to lie downward. Thus, the payment scheme 4 satisfies IC. Therefore, the payment scheme 4 is truthful.
